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We explore the effect of government institutions on the performance of U.S. airports, e.g.
city operated airports compared to single purpose authorities,.  Single purpose authorities have
operating rules specific to airports, so should achieve operational efficiencies.  Alternatively, they
also have more autonomy at conducting rent dissipating activities.  We estimate a modified
McFadden symmetric generalized cost function for airports to distinguish among technical
efficiency, optimal input use (allocative efficiency), and technical change over time.  We find
authorities have a significantly higher level of technical efficiency.  Cities, however, appear more
nimble at adopting labor cost saving innovations over time.  About 1/3 of the cost saving, however,
appears to be dissipated through higher employee wages, and a slower rate of labor saving technical
change.  
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1 We wish to thank, without implicating, Robin Sickles, Janet Kohlhase, Albert Saiz and John
Ashworth.  We are grateful for the research support from a Small Grant from the University of
Houston.  We benefitted from comments at the Regional Science Association Meetings, the
Public Choice Meetings, and from participants at a conference at the Tinbergen Institute.
2  There is no central information on airports, but our survey of the largest airports found that
47.2% were single purpose authorities (or other multiple purpose governments), and 52.8% were
cities.  The most recent changes are airports that have converted to authorities.
I.  INTRODUCTION1
A long-standing issue of interest in public economics is whether, and the extent to which,
institutional incentives affect the policy outcomes of local governments.  We examine this question
by comparing airport operations in the U.S. under two fundamentally different types of government.
About half of U.S. airports are operated by independent single purpose institutions (which we call
authorities).  The other half are operated by traditional multipurpose local government (cities).2  Our
objective is to determine whether institutional form affects the financial results of airports.  An
advantage of our method is that we separately estimate relative efficiency on three key dimensions
that might affect the financial results of airports; allocative efficiency (relative input usage),
technical efficiency (overall cost minimization), and the rate of technical change.  Allocative
efficiency may be affected because the goals of the governing entity (authorities or cities) may not
coincide with economic efficiency.  In our context, inefficiencies arise because inputs are used out
of proportion to their relative costs.  Technical efficiency concerns arise because the governing
entity may not minimize costs given output.  Technical change, or cost innovation, concerns arise
because the form of governance may affect the rapidity with which airports respond to changing
conditions in the airline industry.  Fundamentally, we treat all three forms of (in)efficiency as
resulting from institutional ‘as if’ tastes, in that we estimate systematic deviation from cost
minimization that results from the actions of airport managers.  The interesting question is therefore
whether the tastes of the governing institution affect the observed operating costs of airports.
Theoretically, higher relative efficiency might be expected of either institutional form, cities
or authorities.  On the one hand, independent governmental authorities are specialized institutions
3 In our sample we have two authority governed airports which manage other properties.  
Jacksonville port authority manages Jacksonville sea port, and the Norfolk aviation authority
manages an industrial park.  
4 Of course there are variations.  The most distinct subgroups within authority governed airports
are port authorities, city authorities and county authorities.  Port authorities operate multiple
properties while  the latter two are closely tied to their respective local governments.  In our
sample San Francisco, Omaha, Harlingen (TX) airports are governed by city authorities (i.e.,
authorities with substantial dependence on the city governments).  Reno, Cincinnati and Fort
Lauderdale airports are operated by county authorities.  Data for the largest port authority
operated airports, e.g., JFK, La Guardia, Newark, Seattle, San Diego were unfortunately
unavailable for the study for a variety of unrelated reasons.
5 Airports operated by multipurpose local governments are often operated under a separate
enterprise fund.  FAA rules bar state and local governments from transferring funds generated by
airports to any other activity.  Because of the law against explicit transfer, funds may be
implicitly transferred in the form of higher charges for services provided by other departments of
the respective local governments.  
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designed only to manage airports, and do so in all but a few instances.3  The relative freedom of the
independent authorities may result in more specialization, prompt decision-making, and flexibility
in decisions related to worker employment and purchase of inputs.  The greater focus of airport
authorities, however, may be offset by the relative independence of the authorities from city
residents.  An authority’s board of directors is usually appointed by multiple local governments; e.g.,
some members by the mayor of the city or cities, some by the governor of the state, some by county
officials.  Thus the responsibility of the independent authority is not clearly assignable to any
particular government, giving authorities relative freedom from direct voter control.4  Independence
may facilitate greater rent seeking by bureaucrats in the authority, e.g., purchase of a favored input
at a cost higher than opportunity cost, or at a quantity greater than optimal.  
Multipurpose governments administer airports along with many other public goods, e.g.
roads, fire and police.  Airports operated by multipurpose governments (generally cities) are usually
operated by a separate department of aviation.  While separate, the aviation department nonetheless
operates under the general constraints of the local government bureaucracy, including procurement
rules, contracting, and personnel policies.  Further, city airports are often required to use the
resources of their local governments, such as fire and police.5  These restrictions, not particular to
6  For detailed discussion on different components of overall efficiency see Färe et al (1985).
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the needs of airport operation, amount to an extra constraint on efficient airport operation.  Thus a
general purpose government might be expected to have a lower level of efficiency than an authority
run airport, since its policies are not as focused on airport operations. 
On the other hand, local governments are headed by elected officials who are expected to
be more sensitive to voter demands than appointed officials, so the elected officials may pursue more
cost effective strategies, or provide levels of output in greater demand.  That is, the objective
function of the city operated airports may be consistent with maximizing local welfare, while the
independent authorities may be more concerned with rent seeking activities.  Thus the potentially
lower costs of authority run airports may be balanced against the potentially greater allocative
efficiency of cities.  Our estimation procedure allows us to separately estimate the various aspects
of behavior, as we separately identify the relative cost savings from technical efficiency and cost
innovation over time as well as the allocative efficiency aspects of relative input usage. 
This paper looks at three aspects of efficiency using a unique panel data set of airport
finances from a sample of the largest 100 airports from 1979 to 1992.6  First, allocative efficiency
is measured to assess the ability of airports to equate marginal productivity ratios with the observed
input prices.  Second, technical efficiency is estimated, based on whether there are overall gains
from a particular governmental form.  Finally, allowance is made for differential rates of technical
progress for city operated airports compared to authorities.   Because of the relative freedom of
independent authority airports, we implicitly assume that the observed differences in airport
efficiency are due to the trade-off between fewer constraints for authorities on the one hand, and
different preferences from city operated airports on the other.
Because the form of airport governance is roughly equally divided between cities and
authorities, little difference might be expected in airport operation.  The three separate measures of
efficiency, however, allow a closer examination of the expected trade-offs.  For example, we find
that authority operated airports benefit from operational efficiency, since on average we find the
7  The natural tension between airlines and airports would be interesting to study, but is left to
future work.
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average cost per flight would fall by almost 26% when evaluated at the input shadow prices based
on technical efficiency.  This cost savings, however, is partially absorbed by employees, through
both higher wages and a slower rate of labor saving innovations.  On net, however, we find the
greater efficiency is worth the rent seeking costs, as on net authorities are found to be over 19% less
expensive per flight than are city operated airports.
II.  THE MODEL
Institutional design will be important to airport operations, and will be discernable, if the
inherent objectives of the governments vary systematically with their institutional structure.
Government objectives can be expected to vary depending on the degree of voter control, and the
extent to which responsibility for the airport is diffused among other local governments.  On the
other hand, an alternative possibility is that airlines primarily control the airport, in which case the
form of government may be irrelevant to airport operations.7    Our goal is to empirically determine
whether the degree of efficiency varies by government, and if possible, to discern the extent to
which objectives of the alternative governmental forms differs with their structure.  
We use the above discussion to motivate our model of airport costs, by testing three aspects
of how the cost function might vary across airport governance structures.  One reason governments
turn to single purpose authorities to operate their airports may be frustration with the constraints
within a general purpose government.  By this reasoning, airport operations might be smoother if
the operator is designed solely around airport functions.  Conversely, constraints imposed by the
general purpose government may be cost saving, by enforcing competitive bidding rules or limiting
pay scales of employees.  There may therefore be a trade-off between the greater technical efficiency
level of authorities, and a loss of allocative efficiency if certain inputs are favored in operational
decisions.  Similarly, technical change over time may be greater or less for authorities depending
8  The original inspiration for this research came from a commission that contemplated a change
in organizational form in Houston.  The commission received testimony from several airports
consistent with the trade-off between fewer constraints, and a favored treatment of some inputs.
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on whether operational efficiencies compensate for the potentially greater favor shown certain
inputs.
One key question of interest is whether observed differences in institutional behavior are
because of organizational preferences, or constraints.  Strictly, our procedures cannot differentiate
between these alternative explanations.  Anecdotal information, however, is strongly suggestive that
authorities operate in a less restrictive environment than do city operated airports.8  Since the
removal of constraints should not impede efficiency, we therefore start the interpretation of our
results from this intuition.  That is, if both types of government have as their objective the
minimization of costs, we should observe that authority operated airports are the more efficient
organizational form.  This finding should be apparent in all three types of efficiency, technical,
allocative, and technical change over time.  On the other hand, if we find that city operated airports
are more efficient than authority operated airports in any dimension, we will interpret such a result
as indicative of a distinction in the ‘as if’ expressed tastes of authority governments.  And in fact,
under this interpretation, the measure of inefficiency will be an under-estimate of the strength of
authority tastes, because our measure is relative to city airports, not what authorities could achieve
were they to actually minimize costs.
Thus our model is that airport managers maximize their utility subject to a production
function and several other constraints, including FAA regulations.  We assume these external factors
are equal across types of airports, however, and focus our attention on potential differences in
objectives and internal constraints of the airport operators as influenced by governmental structure.
Consistent with this discussion, an airport manager’s utility function could be specified, (following
Migue and Belanger, 1974; and Orzechowski, 1977), as:
 XSUU , 
(1)
9  Permanence of job, reputation etc. might depend on surplus maximization.
10  Over spending on a favored input could be achieved through a combination of overpayment
per unit and over-utilization.
11  Atkinson and Cornwell (1994b) estimate allocative and technical efficiency parameters using
a translog cost function.  The SGM cost function we use here has the advantage of global
concavity. 
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where U(.) describes the ‘as if’ preferences of the airport operator, S denotes surplus, and X is a
vector of input usage.  The surplus is defined by the difference between the value of the airport
services (i.e., to the airlines, society) and the cost of producing those services.  We assume that
0U/0S is positive, implying that, ceteris paribus, airport managers want to maximize surplus and
therefore minimize cost.9  As rational agents, however, they may also want some share of that
surplus for themselves.  One way to consume the surplus is that airport managers may derive utility
by deviating from cost minimization, measured here as technical (in)efficiency to accomplish other
objectives, like on-the-job consumption of leisure.  Alternatively, managers may choose to spend
more on a favored input (thereby spending relatively less on a less favored input).10  Therefore
0U/0Xi could be positive, negative, or zero depending on the specific input, captured in our
estimation through allocative (in)efficiency, or potentially through altered rates of technical change
over time.
A.  Non-Minimum Cost Function 
The cost function we estimate is based on the Symmetric Generalized McFadden (SGM) cost
function (Diewert and Wales, 1987).  This functional form allows second order flexibility in output
(Y), shadow prices (P*), control variables (Z) and time (t).  The non-minimum aspects are that we
estimate the input shadow prices for allocative efficiency, and an overall shift parameter for
technical efficiency.  Additionally, we allow differential rates of technical change due to
organizational form.11
12  While the number of flights is at least partly dependent on airline behavior as well, this is a
better measure than passengers to the extent load factors are a function of airline pricing.  In any
case, we include passengers as a quality of output variable below, Z.  In general, flights are more
associated with airport costs, and landing fees (the mechanism by which airlines share in airport
costs) are generally calculated per flight, not per passenger.
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Output (Y) is measured here by the number of flights.12  We specify the cost function as
depending on three inputs, labor (L), capital (K), and materials (M).  Each of the inputs has a market
price (P), as well as an associated shadow price (P*).  Control variables Z, which are modeled to
affect the quality of output, consist of the number of passengers and cargo weight.  
 The shadow prices are modeled as proportional shifts of observed prices (Yotopoulos and
Lau, 1971;  Lovell and Sickles, 1983), as:
)2(* iii PkP  
where i indexes the three inputs, L, K, and M.  If the shadow price P* is found not to equal the
market price, then input i will be over (Pi* < Pi) or under (Pi* > Pi) utilized relative to the cost
minimizing level, thus resulting in allocative inefficiency.  We allow shadow prices to vary between
city and authority operated airports through a dummy variable for institutional form.  Since the
conditional input demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in ki, one of the ki ’s cannot be
identified and estimated.  We normalize kK to be unity and estimate kL and kM .  To ensure
nonnegativity of kL and  kM  they are specified as:
  21 CITYggk LCLL  
(3)
  21 CITYggk MCMM  
where CITY is a dummy variable which is unity for the city administered airports and zero for
authority administered airports. 
 Technical inefficiency may arise, as suggested in equation (1), if an airport manager has
tastes over the level of effort, for example to maximize her share of the surplus she may not put forth
13  Differences in scale economies can cause differences in rankings of airports between output
and input technical efficiency.  Since we estimate (approximately)constant returns to scale, our
results differ little.  If input technical efficiency parameters bm are desired instead of output
technical efficiency, total costs are proportionately adjusted rather than output.  Our estimates of
technical efficiency do not materially differ using the alternative method.
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the best possible effort.  Alternatively, however, the institutional form may impose additional
constraints to those explicitly written here, for example contracting may have to go through the city
government bureaucracy in addition to the managerial controls at the airport itself.  Both
possibilities are modeled here through a technical efficiency parameter, a.  
Technical efficiency can be estimated by output technical efficiency, or by input technical
efficiency (Färe and Lovell, 1978).  Output technical (in)efficiency characterizes an airport as failing
to obtain maximum output from a given set of inputs.  Input technical (in)efficiency measures that
minimum inputs are not used given output and the input mix.  In our estimates the two measures end
up being qualitatively identical, and thus we arbitrarily use output technical efficiency.13
As shown by Atkinson and Cornwell (1994a), the general form for a cost frontier capturing
output technical efficiency is 
                                                          (4)
    »¼
º
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where output y  = a f (xi), p is the input prices, a is the technical efficiency parameter, and x is the
input vector.  We specify the technical efficiency parameter, a, to estimate the relative efficiency
of city operated airports compared to those operated by authorities.  If a is observed to be less than
1 for a specific governmental type, airports of that particular governmental type will have output less
than frontier output (non-cost minimization).  Thus to reach the frontier of an efficient airport each
inefficient airport must produce [(y/a) - y] more output, holding costs constant.  We specify the
output technical efficiency parameter a to be a function of only the governmental organization form,
so that:
9                                                                (5) CITYaa CITY *1  
where CITY is a dummy variable equal to one if the airport is operated by a general purpose
government, and equals zero for authorities.
The SGM shadow cost function C*($), incorporating both output technical efficiency and
allocative inefficiency from shadow prices can be written as:
(6)












































































with the i indexing the three inputs labor (L), capital (K), and materials (M), j and k index the two
output quality measures.  The two quality of output measures are ZP, the passenger load factor, and
ZC, the cargo tonnage.  The shadow input prices P* are a function of the observed input prices P as
specified in (3) (Kumbhakar, 1992).  Output (Y), the number of flights, has the technical efficiency
parameter a subscripted by m to indicate the parameter varies by institutional form. 
The g(&) function is defined as in Diewert and Wales by:
g(P*) = P* 1 S P* / 2  1 P*
(7)
14  We use the sample means for each input to ensure invariant elasticity estimates as
recommended by Diewert and Wales (1987).
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S is an 3x3 negative semi definite (NSD) symmetric matrix of parameters to be estimated (they are
the s parameters reported in Table 3), and q = (q 1 , ... , q 3 )’  is a vector of nonnegative constants
assumed to be exogenously given.14 
Estimation uses the conditional input demands obtained by applying Shephard’s Lemma.
As they contain all of the parameters of the cost function, only the demand functions are estimated
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(8)
where i indexes the three inputs.  S i is the ith row of the S matrix of parameters.  
To further illustrate potential differences in governance structure, in addition to allowing the
shadow prices to vary by government, we allow the rate of technical change to vary by government.
We do so by specifying a slope dummy variable for city operation on g t i , the coefficient on the
linear time trend of the input demand function.
An important caveat to our specification of the efficiency consequences of governmental
form is that we do not necessarily estimate the optimal governmental form.  For example, some
countries have allowed private operators to run their airports, but there are no U.S. airports with this
governmental form.  Our efficiency estimates are based on the relative performance of city
compared to authority airports, and the relative choices between labor and materials compared to
capital.  Nonetheless, our estimation should be able to clearly discern whatever systematic
15  Revenue passengers are defined by the FAA as the passengers who pay for their trip.
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distinctions exist between extant institutional forms because the shadow price, technical efficiency,
and technical change parameters are specified to depend on the institutional form. 
III.  Data and Estimation
The unique data set was constructed primarily from three major sources.  The first is
individual airport financial statements from the years 1979 through 1992.  The second is the FAA
statistical handbook.  The third source is the 1987 General Information Survey published by Airport
Operators Council International (AOCI).  In addition to these three, other sources have been utilized
as described below.
The centerpiece of the data set used in this study is the data on airport finances.  Data on
airport finances is not centrally collected.  Therefore the only source of data on airport finances is
the financial statements for each individual airport.  For data on airport finances, the largest 100
airports in terms of the annual total number of enplaned revenue passengers as reported by the 1988
FAA Statistical Handbook (annual) were contacted.15  Annual financial reports from 1970 through
1992 were requested, though we only use the data for the post de-regulation period.  A total of 78
airports responded with varying amounts of data.  
Among the major airports that did not provide data despite repeated requests are: 1) San
Diego, 2) St. Louis, 3) Pittsburgh, 4) Boston Logan and 5) San Juan Airport.  Data from many
airports could not be used because data on some crucial variables were not reported.  For example,
data on all three New York Port Authority operated airports (i.e., JFK, La Guardia, Newark) could
not be used because they did not report data on labor expenses separately from other operating
expenses.  Among other major airports that provided financial statements for at least two years but
for which the data were not usable are Miami International, Denver International, Seattle
International, Phoenix International, Baltimore Washington International, Honolulu, San Jose,
Oakland, Portland (OR) New Orleans and Buffalo airports.  
16 Among the major US airports Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) and all airports in
Hawaii including Honolulu International are state administered.  Neither of these two airports are
able to be included in the sample.   
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Many airports could not provide data for the entire sample period for all variables.  For
Charlotte Airport labor expenses could not be separated from other expenses for the years after
1987.  Some airports provided data for some years with gaps in between.  The Atlanta airport
provided data for all years from 1982 to 1991 and then provided data for 1978-1979, but omitted
1980 and 1981.  The final data set used in this study consists of a sample of an unbalanced panel of
52 airports and 462 observations.  The airports, their ranking by FAA on the basis of passenger
volume, the type of administration, and the number of observations for each of them is presented
in Table 1.
The key variable for our purposes is the type of governmental structure.  Multipurpose
governmental structures that manage airports include cities, counties and states.  In the current
sample of 52 airports, we have classified 26 airports as being administered by multipurpose
governments in the latest sample year, i.e., 1992.  Among this group 19 were administered by city
government, 6 airports by county governments and only Anchorage airport by the state of Alaska.16
A few airports which have been classified as city-operated in this study enjoy a large degree of
independence in administration.  In our work, if the top airport executive is appointed by an
independent commission or board we classify that airport an authority administered airport,
otherwise it is classified as a city (or county or State) airport.  Using this criterion, airports were
classified under the two groups on the basis of information from the individual airport’s financial
report and telephone conversations with airport officials. For example, Philadelphia International
airport has been classified as a city operation, even though the aviation department is overseen by
an Airport Advisory Board whose members are not city bureaucrats.  In the case of Los Angeles,
the overseeing authority is an airport commission which reviews airport operations although the
daily operations are run by the city aviation department.
17  For example, all airports receive FAA grants to build their runways, and thus must abide by
FAA strictures prohibiting funds from being directly transferred to other city departments.
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As mentioned above, the source of financial data on airport finances are individual airports’
statements.  The financial statements for all the airports used in this study except for Milwaukee
Mitchell and Columbia (SC) are audited by well-known accounting firms.  A typical financial report
contains some information on the administrative structure of the airport, a balance sheet and income
statement along with some notes on accounting principles and variable definitions.  Further, a
research advantage of U.S. airports is that the Federal Airport Administration (FAA) imposes certain
rules constraining the interaction between airports and other parts of the city government, so the
institutional environment is relatively similar across airports.17
The output and output characteristics data come from the FAA annual statistical handbook.
It provides data on the number of flights (Y), number of enplaned revenue passengers (Zp), and tons
of cargo and mail (Zc).  The number of enplaned revenue passengers are the subset of all enplaned
passengers who pay for their travel. 
The General Information Survey is a publication on the physical attributes ( i.e., number of
runways, gates) of airports published by  Airport Operators Council International (AOCI).  Most
airports used in the study are members of AOCI.  This source also provides information on
contractual services used by the airports, e.g., whether an airport uses contractual labor to provide
fire or security services. This information was used to adjust airport’s expenditure on in-house labor
(Tipu, 1996). 
Data on labor expenses is taken from the financial statements. Because some airports use
contractual labor more than others, their in-house labor expenses appear less than the other airports.
Since the AOCI survey lists which airports use contractual labor for what services, adjustments have
been made in the labor expenses of those airports.  The price of labor is taken from the average city
government wages of the cities where the airports are located.  We assume that although the wage
rate may not be the true wage rate for airport labor, variations in the city government wages
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represent variations in wage rates of the airport employees, especially the city operated ones.  Since
the shadow prices are assumed to be a function of the form of government, any systematic difference
in the wages of authorities from that of the city operated airports should be captured by the
coefficient of the city dummy that is associated with the wage shadow price.
Materials expenses are also taken from the financial reports.  Material expenses are defined
as all operating expenses other than labor, including utilities, contractual services and miscellaneous
expenses.  The price of materials is constructed by a weighted index of price indices of several items
that account for the all the operating expenses net of labor.  The items and the sources of the price
indices are given in Table 2.  The relative weights for the sub components of materials are taken
from the Omaha airport’s relative utilization ratios for each sample years, which has a very detailed
breakdown of the expenditure categories for every year in the sample. 
Capital expenditure is assumed to be equal to current total revenue minus current total
operating expenses, since airports are constrained to be zero-profit institutions.  Admittedly, this
assumption is important and not free from error, but we are compelled by two reasons besides its
tractability in the absence of airport investment series data.  First, we have no reason to expect this
error to be nonrandom by institutional form.  Second, airports are often challenged in court by
airlines for overcharging. That is, due to the watchdog nature of the self-interested airlines, it is
plausible that the zero-profit constraint is binding.
Since airports are mainly constructed of runways and terminals, a weighted average of the
Federal Highway Administration’s construction price index and office building construction price
index was used as the acquisition price of capital.  The relative weights of terminals and runways
were taken from Wells (1992).  The price or opportunity cost of capital is taken from Moody's AA
grade municipal bond rates.   
After defining the expenditure on the three inputs and constructing their prices,  input
quantities are calculated by dividing the total expenditure on inputs by their prices.  Time is
measured in years.  All the variables are normalized to unity for Kansas International (MO), 1982.
18  Our panel of airport data is unbalanced, and in our view the cost of dropping observations was
worth the small loss in capturing fully flexible time variation.  A similar concern motivated
simplifying the interaction of the two quality variables.  Sensitivity analysis shows the estimates
are not particularly sensitive to alternative specifications, but are somewhat sensitive as to
whether there are a sufficient number of airports of both governance types in the data.
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A.  The Estimating Equation
We estimate a slightly modified version of the SGM cost function using the input demands
as in (8).  First, as is common, we use input levels divided by output to make the homoscedasticity
assumption of the error term more plausible.  Second, we delete two terms using the time variable,
and simplify the quality expressions by deleting some of the full interactions between the two
measures.18  Finally, we add fixed effect terms for each airport.  The resulting system of conditional
input demand functions that we estimate is:
   Xi ($)/Y  = 1/am {(S
 i P*)/(1P* )  -  (  i /2 ) (P* 1 S 
i P*)/(1 P*)2 } + 
+  bi / Y  +  
b Y  i /am +  b Y Y i ( 
Y/am2 )  +  
g t i  t  +  g t t i  t 
2 
/am   +    
  d Y i j  ( Z j /am )      + (9)                                                                            j
 
  d i j  Zj /  Y   +  2*d i ( Z k  Z j /am )   +   vn   +   u                                                                             j 
where i indexes the three inputs, j indexes the two quality measures, m indexes governmental form,
vn are the airport specific fixed effects terms, u is the random error term, and the observation specific
subscripts have been suppressed.  
The effect of institutional form on airport behavior is calculated below based on simulating
the effect of institutional change on the cost function.  That is, were an airport operated by a city
converted to an authority, three changes would occur.  One, the input shadow prices for labor and
materials would change.  Second, the level of technical efficiency would change, and finally the rate
19  Monotonicity is satisfied at every data point of the shadow cost function. Concavity of  the
cost function is satisfied globally since the estimated S matrix is NSD.
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of technical change over time would be altered.  We simulate these changes below by setting the city
dummy variable to zero in all three elements of the specification.
IV.  Results
The estimation results for the parameters of the SGM cost function are presented in Table
3.19  The parameters result from seemingly unrelated estimation of the three factor demand equations
in (9).  We find that there are apparently significant cost savings from switching airport operation
out of general city stewardship to independent authority operation, as authority operated airports
have a significant technical efficiency advantage over airports operated by city governments.
Nonetheless, we also find that the advantages of the authority governance structure are partially
dissipated by that structure, as we find that labor in particular is used much differently in authority
compared to city operated airports both because authorities use a much higher shadow price for
labor, and because labor saving innovations are adopted much more slowly.
The estimated aCITY coefficient in the first row of Table 3 shows that the technical efficiency
of authority operated airports is significantly higher than that for city operated airports.  The
parameter estimate on the city dummy variable in the technical efficiency expression is .307 (.095).
Using equation (5), this estimate suggests that city operated airports produce only 77% (1/(1+.307)
as much output as authorities with the same inputs. 
This difference in technical efficiency affects factor demands as well, as illustrated in the
first row of Table 5.  If the average city operated airport were converted to an authority, holding
constant all else except the technical efficiency coefficient, labor demand is predicted to fall by
37.4%, capital by 25.9%, and material by 30.3%, leading to a drop in overall costs of 33.8% when
evaluated at the observed prices.  These results strongly suggest that there are substantial efficiency
20  Anecdotally, airport operators in Houston have significant complaints about operational
inefficiencies caused by being in the city government, rather than independent.
21  The two shadow prices are significantly different from each other, with a t test of 4.29.
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gains in operation when airports are freed from some of the impediments that accompany being part
of a general city government.20  
There are two sets of allocative efficiency parameters that form the shadow price estimates
according to equation 3.  The gL and gM parameters in the third row of Table 3 for labor and
materials respectively pertain to the shadow price of each input relative to capital (which has a
shadow price normalized to one), while the gLC  and gMC parameters differentiate the shadow price
for cities from that for authorities.  All four of these parameters are found to be statistically different
from zero.
Allocative efficiency pertains to whether the inputs are used by airports in the cost
minimizing ratio.  We find that neither governmental form allocates labor efficiently compared to
capital, in that the shadow price of labor is found to be significantly different from that of capital
(which is normalized to equal the market price). Another way of saying this is that airport operators
are acting as if the price of labor is significantly different from the market price.  Additionally,
however, we find significant differences between city and authority operated airports.  The shadow
price term parameters for labor are gL and gLC.  As presented in Table 4, we estimate the shadow
price of labor for authorities to be .560, calculated from equation (3) by (1-.252)2 using the estimated
gL coefficient.  The shadow price of labor for cities is .417, calculated by (1-.252-1.394)2, using in
addition the gLC coefficient from Table 3.21
Taken at face value, estimating the shadow price of labor to be less than one signifies over-
use of labor relative to capital.  Alternatively, however, the price of either labor or capital may be
mis-measured.  We have no reason to believe, however, that the degree of mis-measurement varies
depending on the governmental form.  Thus we infer more importance to the estimated relative
22  It is also consistent anecdotally, as the Houston airport employees (a city operated airport) all
expressed a desire to work for the Dallas-Fort Worth airport (an authority) because of the
relative wage premium.
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shadow prices that find that authorities significantly under-employ labor (a higher shadow price)
compared to city operated airports.
One reason we believe the relative shadow prices are important is that, while the materials
shadow price is also estimated to be significantly different from one, we find no statistically
significant distinction between airports of the governmental forms as summarized in Table 4.  Using
the coefficient gM from the third line of the materials results in Table 3, we find the shadow price
of materials relative to capital is 0.291 using equation (3) as (1-.46)2 for authorities.  Employing the
parameter gMC from the second line shows the relative shadow price with respect to capital is 0.294
for cities, again using equation (3) as (1-.61-1.08 )2.  Despite that these results suggest the shadow
price for materials relative to capital is quite low, the shadow price is virtually identical for both city
and authority operated airports.
One possibility consistent with these empirical results is that authority operated airports pay
their workers a premium compared to city operated airports.  This possibility is consistent with the
lack of direct governmental oversight over independent authorities as discussed in the rent seeking
literature (Krueger, 1974), although we do not have any direct data to support (or refute) the
hypothesis.22  
If true, however, an alternative estimate of the relative cost differences can be derived by
assuming the difference in the relative shadow prices between cities and authorities is actually
reflected in wages.  To determine the relative importance, therefore, the final column in Table 5
shows the simulated cost differences when city airports are converted to authorities.  This simulation
imputes the technical and allocative(in) efficiencies of authorities to cities,  but inflates the wage
data for authorities by the relative difference in shadow prices.  As the final column shows, the cost
advantage of authority operation falls by about 8.6% in overall costs to 19.86% (from 28.53%).  The
19
cost advantage of authorities is thus shown to be dissipated by about 1/3, but definitely not
completely.
The final set of efficiency results concern the rate of technological innovation through cost
reductions over time.  The time coefficients are on time and time squared, with an interaction term
for city operated airports.  The results in Table 3 show that the time and time squared coefficients
are significantly different than zero in all three of the input demand equations with the exception of
the linear term for labor.  Table 5 summarizes the results with respect to differences in the rate of
technical change between city and authority operated airports.  If city operated airports were
changed to authority operation, the most striking change given the technical efficiency results is that
labor usage has dropped much more slowly over time in authority operated airports.  On average,
labor usage per flight would be almost 16% greater with authorities compared to cities.  This is not
sufficient to offset a statistically insignificant lower amount of capital, and a marginally significant
(t = 1.9) reduced usage of materials.  Evaluated at market prices, total costs due to technical change
rise imperceptibly if city airports were transferred to authorities.  Using the shadow prices, however,
where authorities are found to have significantly higher labor costs, the protection of labor is found
to offset a considerable  share of the total cost saving generated by authority operation (11.35% vs.
25.65% technical efficiency cost saving).  Thus in addition to the potentially higher wages in
authority operation, the use of labor over time is apparently partially protected, in that labor usage
has not fallen at the same rate as for city operated airports. 
 Table 6 reports the estimated returns to scale.  This estimate is from the estimated cost
elasticity as:
      1 - 1/RTS     =     1  - ECY (10)
where RTS is the estimated returns to scale estimate, and ECY is the estimated change in costs due
to a change in output (Kumbhakar, 1992).    The estimated returns to scale is found to be 0.85, and
is not significantly different from one.  This result is primarily important because it indicates the
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technical efficiency results are not sensitive to whether total costs are scaled according to the input
technical efficiency definition, or total output using the output technical efficiency definition (see
note 13).
Table 7 presents the own and cross price input demand elasticities.  The own price elasticities
for each input are negative, and are estimated to be inelastic.  This is roughly consistent with the
allocative efficiency results, in that a 34% higher shadow wage rate leads to a 12% reduced labor
demand   The cross-price elasticities show that the inputs are gross substitutes.  The other result to
note is that the generalized cost function does not require that the cross price elasticities be
symmetric.
V.  Summary and Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine the cost function for U.S. airports, with a
view to understanding the importance of whether the governing institution causes systematic
differences in the cost structure of airports.  Specifically, the performance of airports operated by
single purpose authorities is compared to the performance of those operated by general purpose city
governments.  This comparison is interesting for two reasons.  First, despite the considerable
attention economists have lavished on airlines, the airports themselves have been relatively
neglected.  One reason is the lack of a centralized data source, and the data set assembled for this
paper is a unique compilation of airport finances.  The second reason for comparing the relative
performance of the governing institutions is to gain insight into the relative importance of
institutional trade-offs.  Specifically, we find that the greater focus that specialized authority
government brings to airport management results in a higher level of operational efficiency.  On the
other hand, the greater distance from the true constituents, the city residents/voters, also results in
airport personnel being able to reap some of the financial gains.
Airports are an important part of the infrastructure of an urban area.  As such, they  have a
series of unique attributes unlike other elements of city government, so it may not be surprising if
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airport operators feel constrained by some of the general strictures on operation within a general
purpose government.  On the other hand, city operated airports have at least the potential of affecting
voting outcomes for politicians in city government, including the mayor and city council.  Because
airports are seldom at the forefront of political debate, they constitute an interesting example as to
whether the “threat” of voter scrutiny is an important element of institutional design.
Estimation of the generalized cost function for airports suggests that institutional design is
important for understanding government operations.  Specifically, we find that single purpose
authorities are able to achieve significantly higher levels of technical efficiency than are airports
operated by general purpose governments.  On the other hand, the focus that authorities bring to
airport operation is also brought to remuneration and job quality, as we find that authority run
airports may systematically pay their workers more than city operated airports, and do appear to
protect workers more from what would otherwise be labor saving innovations.  Nonetheless, despite
that their objective function appears to be oriented toward workers, we find that authorities
ultimately have significant cost advantages over city operated airports.  Even accounting for
authority wages being significantly higher than city wages, authority run airports demonstrate cost
savings of almost 20% per flight.  The cost savings are consistent with the fact that the institutional
change has been one-way, from city to authority operation.  An interesting implication of the cost
savings is that 20% appears to be insufficient to motivate all cities to change their governmental
form to single purpose authority operation.  
Another interesting element, although not one we are able to fully analyze here, is that
airlines apparently do not completely ‘capture’ airport operations.  As briefly discussed in the
introduction to the model section, a null hypothesis is that institutional organization would not affect
airport operations because of the pecuniary interests of airlines.  That is, if airlines are able to
internalize all of the benefits from efficient airport operation, it would be in the interests of airlines
to ensure efficient operation at all times.  By this null, the airlines would not tolerate an
organizational form that increases their costs (or decreases profits).  This finding is interesting in
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the context of Brueckner’s (2002) recent work on airport congestion, which discusses how relatively
large airlines will internalize many of the congestion costs which they impose on travelers and other
flights, although not other airlines.  It may be that the inefficiency we measure here is offset by
airline monopoly power.  That is, city governed airports may be less likely to tolerate monopoly
power, because they more fully internalize the general interests of the population.  If this is the case,
then the reason not all of the gains to efficient operation accrue to airlines is that the gains are offset
by higher prices and fewer flights. 
The institutional design question has application in other areas besides airports.  A common
question, for example, is whether special districts should be created to deal with a wide variety of
government enterprise type operations, such as flood control, transportation, hospitals, and ports.
Some of the insight from our research is applicable to these situations, we believe.  Specifically,
creating focused institutions seems to have significant operational savings.  The caveat, however,
is that employees under less direct political supervision will attempt to reap a significant share of
those gains.  It would seem, therefore, that creating focused institutions where there are constraints
on employees would be advantageous.  On the other hand, however, employee constraints appear
to be one of the attributes of the general government.  Thus an alternative may be for the general
purpose governments to grant more operational autonomy to their enterprise functions.  Our research













Chicago O’hare Int’l 1 City 14
Atlanta Hartsfield 2 City 11
Dallas Fort Worth 3 Authority 13
Los Angeles Int’l 4 City 5
San Francisco Int’l 6 Authority 3
Detroit Metro Wayne County 13 City 7
Minneapolis-St. Paul 15 Authority 13
Washington National 18 Authority 5
Houston Intercontinental 20 City 14
Las Vegas McCarran 21 City 14
Philadelphia Int’l 23 City 5
Charlotte Douglas Int’l 24 City 9
Memphis Int’l 25 Authority 4
Washington Dulles Int’l 26 Authority 5
Kansas City Int’l 30 City 13
Houston Hobby 32 City 13
Fort Lauderdale 33 City 5
Cleveland Hopkins Int’l 36 City 10
Nashville Metro 38 Authority 13
Chicago Midway 41 City 8
Indianapolis Int’l 45 Authority 13
Ontario, CA  Int’l 47 City 5
West Palm Beach Int’l 48 City 6
Dayton Int’l 49 City 9
Albuquerque Int’l 51 City 3
Sacramento Metro 55 City 12
Columbus Int’l 57 City & Authoritya 5
Milwaukee Mitchell Int’l 58 City 11
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED








Reno Canon Int’l 59 Authority 13
Norfolk Int’l 60 Authority 2
Tucson Int’l 61 Authority 14
Oklahoma City Will Rogers 63 City 10
Syracuse Hancock Int’l 64 City 11
Jacksonville Int’l 65 Authority 2
Fort Myers Southwest Regional 69 City & Authorityb 12
Omaha Eppley 71 Authority 13
Louiseville Standiford 72 Authority 13
Anchorage 74 City 3
Birmingham Municipal 75 Authority 6
Richmond Int’l 77 Authority 14
Spokane Int’l 80    Authority 13
Sarasota-Bradenton 82 Authority 13
Des Moines 83 City 7
Colorado Springs Municipal 84 City 3
Charleston (SC) AFB Int’l 85 Authority 12
Wichita Mid-Continent 86 Authority 11
Portland (ME) Int’l Jetport 89 City 13
Columbia (SC) Metro 91 Authority 10
Savannah Int’l 92 Authority 8
Boise 93 City 4
Knoxville McGhee-Tyson 96 Authority 2
Harlingen Rio Grande Int’l 99  Authority 5
a  Three observations under city and two observations under authority. 
b  Six observations under city administration and six observations under authority.
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TABLE 2 
COMPONENTS OF THE MATERIALS PRICE INDEX
SUBCOMPONENT  CLASSIFICATION SOURCES
Fuel & Utilities
CPI: Fuel and Utilities
Construction Materials Engelman’s Heavy Construction Price
Index






Office Supplies GDP Deflator for Consumer Goods: Paper
& Stationary





CPI: Water & Sewer
26
TABLE  3: Conditional Input Demand Parameter Estimates
Parameter: var in esting    
                eqn (9)
Estimate Standard Error
acity     Tech eff  a 0.77* .056
sLM     Input prices, see notes 2.26* .496
sMK     Input prices 2.58* .480
sKL     Input prices .111 .255
Labor Equation
bL           1/Y 0.065* .012
b Y L      Y  -0.587* .183
gL           P* b -0.252* .123
gLC         P* b   City  (see eqn 3) -1.394* .232
b Y Y L      Y2 -0.587* .183
g t L         Time -0.012 .024
g t city L     Time*City -0.014* .006
g t t L        Time2 0.002* .0009
dP L         ZP/Y 1.089* .119
dC L         ZC/Y 0.011* .003
d C P L      ZP*ZC 0.002 .001
d P L        ZP 0.066 .141
d C L        ZC -0.018* .009
Material Equation
bM           1/Y -0.040 .024
b Y M      Y 0.086 .352
gM           P*  b -1.082* .137
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TABLE  3 (cont)
Parameter: var in esting               
     eqn (9)            
Estimate Standard Error
gM C         P* b   City (see eqn 3) -0.460* .069
b Y Y M      Y2 0.086 .352
g t M         Time 2.699* .266
g t city M     Time*City 0.024* .007
g t t M        Time2 0.006* .0013
dP M         ZP/Y -0.328* .048
dC M         ZC/Y 0.011 .013
d C P M      ZP*ZC 0.004* .001
d P M        ZP -0.579* .284
d C M        ZC -0.053* .017
Capital Equation
bK           1/Y -0.038 .025
b Y K      Y -0.167 .183
b Y Y K     Y2 -0.167 .370
g t K         Time 2.068* .308
g t city K     Time*City 0.009 .007
g t t K        Time2 0.013* .002
dP K         ZP/Y -0.114* .037
dC K         ZC/Y 0.005 .009
d C P K      ZP*ZC 0.003* .001
d P K        ZP -0.262 .295
d C K        ZC -0.009 .018
Notes:
ZP=passengers, ZC=cargo.  The parameter estimates in the top rows belong to the S matrix.  The diagonal
elements are derived from these estimates, such that sLL= -sLK-sLM,  sKK= -sLK-sKM, and  sMM=-sLM-sKM.  
Adjusted R2  for labor = .78, for capital = .74 , and for materials = .79   
a  Technical efficiency is reported from 1/(1+aCITY CITY), where aCITY is estimated as 0.307 (.095).  
b  The shadow price Pi* = Pi(1 - gi - giC CITY) 2 for i = L, M, the capital price is normalized to one.
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TABLE   4:  Allocative Efficiency, estimated k value  
(standard errors in parentheses)












*k is the estimated difference between the observed price and the shadow price where P*=kP
These estimates use the coefficient estimates of Table 3 for gi and for giC (where i is labor, materials,
and capital) in equations (3) (see text).
TABLE   5:  Changes in Input Demands if City Operated Airports Were
Transferred to Authorities  
(standard errors in parentheses)





















































All entries are the log difference of the mean predicted values.
1Derived by comparing the predicted input demands and costs using equation (5) in (9) for city
operated airports to the predicted input demands and costs when the aCITY parameter is set equal
to zero (thus the technical efficiency of authorities).
2Derived by comparing the predicted input demands and costs using (3) in (9) for city operated
airports to the predicted input demands and costs when the gLC and gMC parameters are set to zero
(thus giving the authority shadow price). 
3Derived by comparing the predicted input demands and costs using (9) for city operated airports
to the estimated predicted values when the gt CITY i parameter is set equal to zero (thus with the rate
of technical change of authorities).  
4Derived by adjusting the market prices by the relative difference between the authority and city
estimated shadow prices (thus assuming the authority actually pays the estimated shadow price
differential).  
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TABLE   6:  Returns to Scale
Mean Standard Error
Returns to Scale1 .85 .27
 
1 Calculated from the total expenditure elasticity, see equation (10).




















Standard errors in parentheses.  
Reported elasticities are the mean of the observation specific predicted elasticities. 
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